We study deterministic single object auctions in the private values environment. We show that an allocation rule is implementable (in dominant strategies) and non-bossy if and only if it is a strongly rationalizable allocation rule. With a mild continuity condition, we show that an allocation rule is implementable and non-bossy if and only if it is a simple utility maximizer (with appropriate tie-breaking). All our characterizations extend the seminal result of Roberts (1979) from the unrestricted domain to the restricted domain of single object auctions.
Introduction
We study single object auctions in the private values model. We restrict attention to deterministic single object auctions, i.e., auctions where the probability of allocating the object to any agent is either zero or one. An allocation rule for single object auction is implementable if we can find payments such that truth-telling is a dominant strategy for every agent. A central result in mechanism design is that the efficient allocation rule in the single object auction private values model is implementable using the Vickrey auction (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973) . On the other hand, a revenue maximizing auction in the independent private values model maximizes the virtual valuations of the agents (Myerson, 1981) . English auction with a reserve price is popular in practice (seen on EBay and other Internet sites) and in theory, for instance, in designing approximately optimal auctions (Hartline and Roughgarden, 2009; Dhangwatnotai et al., 2010) . Such an auction implements a constrained efficient allocation rule with a reserve price -it does not allocate the object if the valuation of each bidder is less than the reserve price, but when it allocates the object it does so to the highest bidder.
While the set of implementable allocation rules is quite rich, we encounter only these particular simple class of implementable allocation rules in theory and practice. Hence, it is important to understand how these allocation rules distinguish themselves from the remaining implementable allocation rules. A primary motivation of this paper is to carry out a systematic analysis of this question axiomatically.
Common features of all these auctions are that the allocation rules are deterministic, dominant strategy implementable, and involve maximization of some form. If ties in these maximizations are broken carefully, then the allocation rules mentioned above satisfy another appealing property -non-bossiness. Non-bossiness is the following requirement. Suppose agent i is not winning the object at a particular valuation profile (v i , v −i ) and we go to another valuation profile (v ′ i , v −i ), where the valuation of only agent i changes, such that agent i still does not win the object. Then, the agent who was winning the object at the valuation profile (v i , v −i ) continues to win the object at (v ′ i , v −i ). In other words, if an agent cannot change his own outcome, then it cannot change the outcome of any other agent.
1
We provide a complete characterization of implementable and non-bossy allocation rules. For this characterization, we introduce a novel notion of rationalizability in the single object allocation model, and use it to define a class of allocation rules that we call the strongly ratio- 1 The use of non-bossiness axiom in social choice theory with private good allocations, specially matching problems, is extensive -it was first used by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) , and subsequently in matching problems (Svensson, 1999; Papai, 2000; Ehlers, 2002; Hatfield, 2009 ) and cost sharing problem (Mutuswami, 2005) . nalizable allocation rules. Our characterization says that an allocation rule is implementable and non-bossy if and only if it is a strongly rationalizable allocation rule.
Under a mild continuity condition, we sharpen our characterization. We define the notion of a simple utility function, which is any non-decreasing function that maps the set of possible valuations of an agent to the set of real numbers. A simple utility maximizer is an allocation rule that chooses a simple utility function for every agent. Then, at every valuation profile (a) it does not allocate the object if every agent has negative simple utility and (b) if at least one agent has positive simple utility, then it allocates the object to an agent with the highest simple utility. We show that if an allocation rule satisfies a mild continuity condition, then it is implementable and non-bossy if and only if it is a simple utility maximizer allocation rule (supplemented with an appropriate tie-breaking rule).
All the commonly used allocation rules in single object auctions (e.g., efficient allocation rule, efficient allocation rule with a reserve price, the optimal auction allocation rule in Myerson (1981) ) are simple utility maximizer allocation rules. Hence, our results provide an axiomatic foundation for a rich class of commonly used allocation rules. Although we characterize implementable and non-bossy allocation rules, using revenue equivalence (Myerson, 1981) , we can pin down the payments that will implement these allocation rules. Thus, we get a complete characterization of "mechanisms" that use non-bossy allocation rules.
Our characterizations have a common feature -implementability and non-bossiness is equivalent to some form of maximization by the seller at every valuation profile. These results relate to two fundamental results in mechanism design and auction theory. A benchmark result in private value mechanism design in quasi-linear environments is the Roberts' affine maximizer theorem (Roberts, 1979) . It considers general multidimensional type spaces with finite set of alternatives. A type of an agent in such models is a vector in R |A| , where A is the set of alternatives. Roberts (1979) showed that if there are at least three alternatives and the type space is unrestricted (i.e., R |A| ), then every onto implementable allocation rule is an affine maximizer. It can be shown that every affine maximizer is implementable. 2 An affine maximizer can be thought to be a linear simple utility function. The single object auction model has a restricted type space. As a result, Roberts' result does not apply. Our characterizations can be thought as extension of Roberts' affine maximizer result to the single object auction model. Further, in a seminal result, Border (1991) showed that the interim allocation probability obtained by every Bayesian and randomized allocation rule can be obtained by taking con- 2 Carbajal et al. (2012) show that if there are at least three alternatives and the type space of every agent is unrestricted, then an onto allocation rule is implementable if and only if it is a lexicographic affine maximizer. Lexicographic affine maximizers contain a particular class of affine maximizers where ties are broken carefully.
vex combination of certain dominant strategy implementable allocation rules that he called hierarchical allocation rules -see also Manelli and Vincent (2010) ; Deb and Pai (2013) . As we discuss later, a hierarchical allocation rule can be written as a convex combination of simple utility maximizer allocation rules that we identify (which are deterministic, dominant strategy implementable, and non-bossy allocation rules). Hence, the set of dominant strategy implementable and non-bossy deterministic allocation rules occupy a pivotal role in the set of all randomized and Bayesian implementable allocation rules.
Finally, we extend our idea of simple utility maximizer allocation rule to define an even larger class of allocation rules that we call generalized utility maximizer allocation rules. We show that implementability is equivalent to these allocation rules. While this result is also in the spirit of Roberts' affine maximizer theorem, the proof is a simple consequence of Myerson's monotonicity characterization of implementable allocation rule, which we discuss below. Generalized utility maximizers are more complex allocation rules than simple utility maximizers. This shows how a natural condition like non-bossiness helps us to separate complex auction rules from simple and commonly used auction rules. Myerson (1981) shows that implementability is equivalent to a monotonicity property of the allocation rules.
Relationship with Literature
3 The monotonicity property is equivalent to requiring that for every agent i and for every valuation profile of other agents, there is a cutoff valuation of agent i below which he does not get the object and above which he gets the object.
4
The relationship between our results and the monotonicity characterization can be best illustrated by reference to parallel results in the strategic voting literature. Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) show that Maskin monotonicity, the counterpart of monotonicity in the strategic voting models, is necessary for dominant strategy implementation, and if the domain is unrestricted then it is also sufficient. However, the seminal results of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) show that dictatorship is the only dominant strategy implementable voting rule satisfying unanimity.
In the quasi-linear private values models, Roberts' theorem can be thought of as the counterpart of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) . After the result of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) , a vast literature in social choice the-3 See also extensions of this characterization to the multidimensional private values models in Bikhchandani et al. (2006) ; Saks and Yu (2005) ; Ashlagi et al. (2010); Cuff et al. (2012) ; Mishra and Roy (2012) . 4 The results in Myerson (1981) are more general. In particular, he considers implementation in BayesNash equilibrium and allows for randomization. But the expected revenue maximizing allocation rule he identifies is a deterministic and dominant strategy implementable allocation rule.
ory has pursued the characterization of implementable allocation rules in restricted "voting" domains, e.g., the median voting rule and its generalizations characterize implementable allocation rules in single-peaked domains (Moulin, 1980; Barbera et al., 1993) . Indeed, these characterizations of implementable allocation rules are all in the spirit of Roberts' theoremthey describe the precise parameters that are required to design an implementable allocation rule. In this spirit, our results give explicit characterization of implementable allocation rules for the single object auction model. There have been extensions of Roberts' theorem to certain environments. For instance, Mishra and Sen (2012) show that Roberts' theorem holds in certain bounded but full dimensional type spaces under an additional condition of neutrality. Their neutrality condition is vacuous in the single object auction model. Moreover, the type space in the single object auction model is not full dimensional. Carbajal et al. (2012) extend Roberts' theorem to certain restricted type spaces which satisfy some technical conditions. Though it covers many interesting models, including those with infinite set of alternatives, the single object auction model does not satisfy their technical conditions. Marchant and Mishra (2012) extend Roberts' theorem to the case of two alternatives. Since the number of alternatives in the single object auction model is more than two, their results do not hold in our model. Jehiel et al. (2008) show that a version of the Roberts' theorem holds even in the interdependent values model (they require implementation in ex-post equilibrium). They also require the complete domain assumption like Roberts (1979) , and remark that their result does not hold in restricted one-dimensional settings like the single object auction.
Two related work in computer science literature deserve special mention. Lavi et al. (2003) focus on a particular restricted domain, which they call order-based domains (this includes some auction domains). Under various additional restrictions on the allocation rule (which includes an independence condition), they show that every implementable allocation rule must be an "almost" affine maximizer -roughly, almost affine maximizers are affine maximizers for large enough values of types of agents.
Next, Archer and Tardos (2002) consider the single object auction model and show that if the object is always allocated then the only implementable allocation rules satisfying nonbossiness and three more additional conditions are min function allocation rules.
5 Min function allocation rules are simple utility maximizer allocation rules, but with some additional limiting and continuity properties. Though our characterization of simple utility maximizer is related to their result, it has several important differences. First, their result requires that we always sell the good. This rules out any allocation rule with a reserve price, such as Myerson's revenue maximizing allocation rule. Further, our proof shows that allowing the object to be not sold adds several non-trivial complications in deriving our results. Second, they seem to require different types of range and tie-breaking conditions than our continuity requirement. On the other hand, our characterization of simple utility maximizer makes it explicit the way ties need to be broken. Finally, they have no analogue of our other characterizations.
There have been many simplifications of the original proof of Roberts (Jehiel et al., 2008; Lavi, 2007; Dobzinski and Nisan, 2009; Vohra, 2011; Mishra and Sen, 2012) . But none of these proofs show how Roberts' theorem can be extended to a restricted domain like the single object auction model. Unlike most of the literature, our goal is not to characterize "affine maximizers" -indeed, all our characterizations capture a larger class of implementable allocation rules than affine maximizers.
An alternate approach is to characterize the set of dominant strategy mechanisms directly by imposing conditions on mechanisms rather than just on allocation rules. A contribution along this line is Ashlagi and Serizawa (2011) . They show that any mechanism which always allocates the object, satisfies individual rationality, non-negativity of payments, anonymity in net utility, and dominant strategy incentive compatiblity must be the Vickrey auction. This result is further strengthened by Mukherjee (2012) , who shows that any strategy-proof and anonymous (in net utility) mechanism which always allocates the object must use the efficient allocation rule. Further, Sakai (2012) characterizes the Vickrey auction with a reserve price using various axioms on the mechanism (this includes an axiom on the allocation rule which requires a weak version of efficiency). By placing minimal axioms on allocation rules, we are able to characterize a broader class of mechanisms (using revenue equivalence) than these papers.
The Single Object Auction Model
A seller is selling an indivisible object to n potential agents (buyers). The set of agents is denoted by N := {1, . . . , n}. The private value of agent i for the object is denoted by v i ∈ R ++ . The set of all possible private values of agent i is V i ⊆ R ++ -note that we do not allow zero valuations. We will use the usual notations v −i and V −i to denote a profile of valuations without agent i and the set of all profiles of valuations without agent i respectively.
The set of alternatives is denoted by A := {e 0 , e 1 , . . . , e n }, where each e i is a vector in R n .
In particular, e 0 is the zero vector in R n and e i is the unit vector in R n with i-th component 1 and all other components zero. The j-th component of the vector e i will be denoted by
The alternative e 0 is the alternative where the seller keeps the object and for every i ∈ N, e i is the alternative where agent i gets the object. Notice that our model focuses on deterministic alternatives. Every agent i ∈ N gets zero value from any alternative where he does not get the object. An allocation rule is a mapping f : V → A. For every v ∈ V and for every i ∈ N, the notation f i (v) ∈ {0, 1} will denote if agent i gets the object (f i (v) = 1) or not (f i (v) = 0) at valuation profile v in allocation rule f . Payments are allowed and agents have quasi-linear utility functions over payments. A payment rule of agent i ∈ N is a mapping p i : V → R.
Definition 1 An allocation rule f is implementable (in dominant strategies) if there exist payment rules (p 1 , . . . , p n ) such that for every agent i ∈ N and for every
In this case, we say (p 1 , . . . , p n ) implement f and the mechanism (f, p 1 , . . . , p n ) is incentive compatible.
Notice that we focus on deterministic dominant strategy implementation. Myerson (1981) showed that the following notion of monotonicity is equivalent to implementability -see also Laffont and Maskin (1980) for a similar characterization.
Definition 2 An allocation rule f is monotone if for every i ∈ N, for every v −i ∈ V −i , and for every
Myerson (1981) shows that an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it is monotone -this result does not require any restriction on the space of valuations (see Vohra (2011) , for instance). Throughout the paper, our results will be driven by the monotonicity condition.
3 Implementation, Non-Bossiness, and Rationalizability
We now provide the main results of this paper. We will define the notion of a non-bossy allocation rule. Then, we will provide a complete characterization of non-bossy and implementable allocation rules. Finally, we will add a mild continuity-like condition to sharpen this characterization even further.
The backbone of this result is a notion of rationalizability in our model, and this reveals an elegant structure of implementable and non-bossy allocation rules. We introduce this idea of rationalizability in the single object auctions next.
Rationalizability
To define rationalizability in our context, we view the mechanism designer as a decision maker who is making choices using his allocation rule. Notice that at every profile of valuations, by choosing an alternative, the mechanism designer assigns values to each agent -zero to all agents who do not get the object but positive value to the agent who gets the object. Denote by 1 v i the vector of valuations in R n + , where all the components except agent i has zero and the component corresponding to agent i has v i . Further, denote by 1 0 the n-dimensional zero vector. For convenience, we will write 1 0 as 1 v 0 at any valuation profile.
Using this notation, at a valuation profile (v 1 , . . . , v n ), a mechanism designer's choice of an alternative in A can lead to the selection of one of the following (n + 1) vectors in R n + to be chosen -1 v 0 , 1 v 1 , . . . , 1 vn . We will refer to these vectors as utility vectors. Any allocation rule f can alternatively thought of choosing utility vectors at every valuation profile. The domain of valuations V i of agent i gives rise to a set of feasible utility vectors where only agent i gets positive value. In particular define for every i ∈ N, To define the notion of a rational allocation rule, we will use orderings (reflexive, complete, and transitive binary relation) on the set of utility vectors D. For any ordering on D, let ≻ be the asymmetric component of and ∼ be the symmetric component of . A strict linear ordering is an anit-symmetric ordering with no symmetric component. An ordering on D is monotone if for every i ∈ N, for every v i , v
Our notion of rational allocation requires that at every profile of valuations it must choose a maximal element among the utility vectors at that valuation profile, where the maximal element is defined using a monotone ordering on D.
An example with three agents will clarify some of the concepts.
Example 1 Let N = {1, 2, 3}. So, the set of alternatives is A = {e 0 , e 1 , e 2 , e 3 }.
In that case, the utility vectors are vectors in R (2, 1, 1) . Now, consider the following ordering defined on D:
monotone. Consider an allocation rule f , which chooses the -maximal utility vector at every valuation profile. For instance, consider the utility vectors corresponding to valuation profile (2, 3, 1) (shown in Figure 1(a) ). The -maximal utility vector at this valuation profile is (0, 3, 0) and hence, f allocates the object to agent 2. Similarly, consider the utility vectors corresponding to valuation profile (2, 1, 1) (shown in Figure 1(b) ). The -maximal utility vector at this valuation profile is (0, 0, 0) and hence, f does not allocate the object to any agent. We call such allocation rules rationalizable allocation rules. We now formally define a rationalizable allocation rule. For every allocation rule f , let
f (v) = e j for any j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}. 
Definition 3 An allocation rule f is rationalizable if there exists a monotone ordering on
In this case, we say ≻ strongly rationalizes f .
We will investigate the relationship between (strongly) rationalizable allocation rules and implementable allocation rules. The following lemma establishes that a rational allocation rule is implementable.
Lemma 1 Every rationalizable allocation rule is implementable.
Proof : Consider a rationalizable allocation rule f and let be the corresponding ordering on D. Fix an agent i and valuation profile v −i . Consider two valuations of agent i: v i and
Since is monotone,
Hence, f is monotone, which further implies that it is implementable (Myerson, 1981) .
The converse of Lemma 1 is not true. The following example establishes that.
Example 2 Suppose there are two agents:
It is easy to verify that f is monotone, and hence, implementable.
We argue that f is not a rationalizable allocation rule. Assume for contradiction that f is a rationalizable allocation rule and is the corresponding monotone ordering. Consider the profile of valuation (v 1 , v 2 ), where v 1 = 1 and v 2 = 2. For ǫ > 0 but arbitrarily close to zero,
Hence,
A feature of this example is that at valuation profile (v 1 , v 2 ), the allocation rule was choosing e 2 . But when valuation of agent 1 changed to v ′ 1 , it chose e 0 at valuation profile
Hence, agent 1 could change the outcome without changing his own outcome. As we show next, such allocation rules are incompatible with rationalizability.
Non-bossy Single Object Auctions
In this section, we will show that the set of implementable and non-bossy allocation rules are characterized by strongly rationalizable allocation rules.
Definition 4 An allocation rule f is non-bossy if for every
Non-bossiness requires that if an agent does not change his own allocation (i.e., whether he is getting the object or not) by changing his valuation, then he should not be able to change the allocation of anyone. It was first proposed by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) . As discussed in the introduction, it is a plausible condition to impose in private good allocation problems and has been extensively used in the strategic social choice theory literature.
We give an example of a bossy and a non-bossy allocation rule in Figure 2 Figure  2 (a), the allocation rule is bossy since if we start from a region where alternative e 2 is chosen and agent 1 increases his value, then we can come to a region where alternative e 0 is chosen (i.e., agent 1 can change the outcome without changing his own outcome). However, such a problem is absent for the allocation rule in Figure 2 (b). Proof : Let f be a strongly rationalizable allocation rule with ≻ being the corresponding ordering on D. Fix an agent i and
Assume for contradiction e l = e j . Then, we get that 1 v j ≻ 1 v l and 1 v l ≻ 1 v j , which is a contradiction.
This leads to the formal connection between implementability and rationalizability.
Theorem 1 An allocation rule is implementable and non-bossy if and only if it is strongly rationalizable.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in the appendix. Theorem 1 reveals a surprising connection between rationalizability and single object auction design. Such a connection of rationalizability and mechanism design was first established in Mishra and Sen (2012) . They consider general quasi-linear environments with private values. They show that if the type space is a multidimensional open interval, then every implementable and neutral allocation rule is rationalizable. Note that rationalizability is weaker than strong rationalizability in the sense that it does not require the underlying ordering to be a strict linear ordering. Our results depart from those in Mishra and Sen (2012) in many ways. First, as discussed earlier, their domain condition is not satisfied in our model, and neutrality is vacuous in the single object auction models. Second, we show that implementability and non-bossiness is equivalent to strong rationalizability. Mishra and Sen (2012) do not provide any such equivalence. Indeed, the non-bossiness that we use, is a condition that is specific to private good allocation problems, and cannot be used in general mechanism design problems. Notice that Theorem 1 does not require any restriction on V i . If the strict linear ordering we constructed in the proof of Theorem 1 can be represented using a utility function, then the characterization will be even more direct. If for every agent i ∈ N, V i is finite, then it is possible. But, as the next example illustrates, this is not always possible.
Example 3
Suppose N = {1, 2} and V 1 = V 2 = R ++ . Consider the allocation rule f such that for all valuation profiles (
and f (v 1 , v 2 ) = e 0 otherwise. It can be verified that f is implementable (monotone) and non-bossy. By Theorem 1, f is strongly rationalizable. Now, consider the strict linear order defined in the proof of Theorem 1 that strongly rationalizes f -denote it by ≻ f . If
Now, consider the following definition.
Definition 5 An ordering on the set D is separable if there exists a countable set Z ⊆ D such that for every x, y ∈ D with x ≻ y, there exists z ∈ Z such that x z y.
It is well known that an ordering on D has a utility representation if and only if it is separable -the result goes back to at least Debreu (1954) (see also Fishburn (1970) for details). We show that ≻ f is not separable. Consider v 1 = v 2 = 1. By definition of f ,
Note that since ≻ f is monotone, any utility vector between 1 v 1 and 1 v 2 (according to ≻ f ) will be of the form 1 v 2 +ǫ or 1
Simple Utility Maximization
We saw that the strict linear ordering that strongly rationalizes an allocation rule may not have a utility representation. The aim of this section is to explore minimal conditions that allow us to define a new ordering for any implementable and non-bossy allocation rule which has a utility representation. This allows us to sharpen our characterization, and relate it to a seminal result of Border (1991) . Our extra condition is a continuity condition.
Definition 6 An allocation rule f satisfies Condition C * if for every i, j ∈ N (i = j) and for every v −ij , for every ǫ > 0, there exists a δ ǫ,v −ij > 0 such that for every
Condition C * requires some version of continuity of the allocation rule. It says that if some agent i is winning the object at a valuation profile, for every increase in value of agent i, there exists some increase in value of agent j such that agent i continues to win the object. Later, we provide an example to show that Condition C * and non-bossiness do not imply implementability.
If f is monotone (implementable) and non-bossy, then Condition C * implies that for every i, j ∈ N (i = j) and for every v −ij , for every ǫ > 0, there exists a δ ǫ,v −ij > 0 such that for
To see this, choose some δ ∈ (0, δ ǫ,v −ij ) and assume for contradiction,
j , e k }, again a contradiction to Condition C * . Since we will use Condition C * along with implementability and non-bossiness, we can freely make use of this implication.
We will now introduce a new class of allocation rules.
Definition 7 An allocation rule f is a simple utility maximizer (SUM) if there exists a non-decreasing function
, where U 0 (0) = 0, such that for every valuation profile v ∈ V , f (v) = e j implies that j ∈ arg max i∈N ∪{0} U i (v i ).
Notice that an SUM allocation rule is simpler to state and, hence, more suitable for practical use than a strongly rationalizable allocation rule. The aim of this section is to show that the SUM allocation rules are not much different from the strongly rationalizable allocation rules.
It can be easily seen that not every SUM allocation rule is non-bossy. For instance, consider the efficient allocation rule that allocates the good to an agent with the highest value. Suppose there are three agents with valuations 10, 10, 8 respectively and suppose that the efficient allocation rule allocates the object to agent 1. Consider the valuation profile (10, 10, 9) and suppose that the efficient allocation rule now allocates the object to agent 2. This violates non-bossiness. As we will show that such violations can happen in case of ties (as was the case here with ties between agents 1 and 2), and when ties are broken carefully, an SUM allocation rule becomes non-bossy.
Similarly, not every SUM allocation rule is implementable. For instance, consider an example with two agents {1, 2} with V 1 = V 2 = R ++ . Let U 1 (v 1 ) = 1 and U 1 (v 2 ) = v 2 . Now, suppose we pick agent 1 as the winner of the object at valuation profile (1, 1) but pick agent 2 as the winner of the object at valuation profile (2, 1). Note that this is consistent with simple utility maximization but violates monotonicity, and hence, not implementable. Now, consider the following modification of the SUM allocation rule.
Definition 8 An allocation rule f is a simple utility maximizer (SUM) with orderbased tie-breaking if there exists a non-decreasing function U i : V i → R for every i ∈ N ∪ {0}, where U 0 (0) = 0, and a monotone strict linear ordering ≻ on D such that for every valuation profile v ∈ V , f (v) = e j implies that j ∈ arg max i∈N ∪{0} U i (v i ) and 1 v j ≻ 1 v k for all k = j and k ∈ arg max i∈N ∪{0} U i (v i ), i.e., 1 v j is the unique simple utility maximizer according to ≻.
The tie-breaking rule that we specified is very general. It covers some intuitive tiebreaking rules such as having an ordering over N ∪ {0} and breaking the tie in simple utility maximization using this ordering.
Lemma 3 An SUM allocation rule with order-based tie-breaking is implementable.
Proof : Suppose f is an SUM allocation rule with order-based tie-breaking. Let the corresponding simple utility functions be U 0 , U 1 , . . . , U n and ≻ be the ordering used to break ties. At any valuation profile v, let
Fix an agent i and the valuation profile of other agents at v
and hence, implementable.
An SUM allocation rule with order-based tie-breaking is also non-bossy.
Lemma 4 An SUM allocation rule with order-based tie-breaking is non-bossy.
Proof : Let f be an SUM allocation rule with order-based tie-breaking and v be a valuation profile such that f (v) = e j for some j ∈ N. Suppose f (v
Then, by definition, the unique simple utility maximizer of f remains the same in (v j , v −j ) and (v
, and hence, f is non-bossy.
We are now ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 2 Suppose V i = (0, β i ), where β i ∈ R ++ ∪ {∞}, for all i ∈ N and f is an allocation rule satisfying Condition C * . Then, the following statements are equivalent.
f is an implementable and non-bossy allocation rule.

f is a simple utility maximizer allocation rule with order-based tie-breaking.
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in the Appendix. The non-trivial part of the proof is to establish that under Condition C * , implementability and non-bossiness imply simple utility maximization. This part of the proof is long and tedious, but reveals beautiful structure of implementable and non-bossy allocation rules. Once this is established, we use Theorem 1 to conclude how the ties must be broken. As we discussed earlier, the strict linear ordering induced by an implementable and non-bossy allocation rule on the set of utility vectors D may not have a utility representation. Hence, we cannot invoke Theorem 1 directly to show Theorem 2. The proof of Theorem 2 constructs another ordering (which is not a linear order) and shows that this has a utility representation under Condition C * . We provide some remarks on Theorem 2 below.
Some simple utility maximizers. An efficient allocation rule is also an SUM allocation rule, where U i (v i ) = v i for all i ∈ N and for all v i ∈ V i . Similarly, we can define for every i ∈ N and for every v i ∈ V i , U i (v i ) = λ i v i + κ i for some λ i ≥ 0 and κ i ∈ R, and this SUM will correspond to the affine maximizer allocation rules of Roberts (1979) . The simple utility function in Myerson (1981) takes the form
, where F i and f i are respectively the cumulative density function and density function of the distribution of valuation of agent i.
Payments. It is well known that revenue equivalence (Myerson, 1981) implies that for any implementable allocation rule, the payments are determined uniquely up to an additive constant. Suppose V i is an interval for all i ∈ N. For any implementable allocation rule f , define the cutoff for agent i and valuation profile v −i as κ Other versions of non-bossiness. Another version of non-bossiness, which seems appealing is the utility non-bossiness. Utility non-bossiness is a condition on mechanisms rather than on allocation rules only. In particular, an incentive compatible mechanism (f, p) satisfies utility non-bossiness if for every i ∈ N, for every v −i , and for every v i , v
In words, if an agent changes his valuation such that his net utility does not change, then the net utility of every agent must remain unchanged.
We do not impose such version of utility non-bossiness because this is a condition on mechanisms, and we are interested in conditions on allocation rules. Further, utility nonbossiness is not satisfied by many canonical mechanisms. For instance, the second-price Vickrey auction is not utility non-bossy. To see this, consider an example with two agents with valuations 10 and 7 respectively. Note that the allocation rule in a second-price Vickrey auction is an efficient allocation rule. The net utilities of agents 1 and 2 in the second-price Vickrey auction are 3 and 0 respectively. Now, consider the valuation profile (10, 8) . At this valuation profile, agent 2 continues to get zero net utility in the second price Vickrey auction, but the net utility of agent 1 is reduced to 2. This shows that the second-price Vickrey auction is not utility non-bossy. On the other hand, the efficient allocation rule with order-based tie-breaking is a non-bossy allocation rule.
Condition C
* . We give an example of an allocation rule which is non-bossy and satisfies Condition C * but not implementable. The example illustrates that Condition C * and nonbossiness do not make implementability a redundant condition. In other words, these two conditions together are not stronger than monotonicity.
Example 4
The allocation rule f is defined as follows. It chooses e 0 (not allocating the object) if U 1 (v 1 ) and U 2 (v 2 ) are less than −1. Else, it allocates the object to the agent with the highest U i (v i ), breaking ties in favor of agent 1.
Clearly, this allocation rule is not monotone, and hence, not implementable. However, it is non-bossy and satisfies Condition C * .
Randomization and Bayesian Implementation via Border's Hierarchical Allocation Rules
We relate our results to Border's hierarchical allocation rules (Border, 1991) . 6 Border considered allocation rules which are not necessarily deterministic and Bayesian implementable.
To describe his results, we consider randomized allocation rules in this section. A randomized allocation rule is a map f : V → ∆A, where ∆A denotes the convex hull of the (n + 1) vectors {e 0 , e 1 , . . . , e n } in R n . Hence, f i (v) will now denote the probability of agent i getting the object at valuation profile v. Border (1991) considers independent private values setting. Each bidder i has a probability distribution G i using which it draws its value from V i . Denote by
The interim allocation probability of an allocation rule f for agent i is
Border also considers Bayesian implementation. An allocation rule f is Bayesian implementable if there exists a payment rules (p 1 , . . . , p n ) such that for every i ∈ N, for every
Definition 9 An allocation rule f h is a hierarchical allocation rule if there exists non-
In a seminal result, Border showed that for every Bayesian implementable allocation rule f , there exist a set of hierarchical allocation rules whose randomization gives the same interim allocation probability as f -see also Manelli and Vincent (2010); Mierendorff (2011); Deb and Pai (2013) . Now, notice that a hierarchical allocation rule is a randomization over simple utility maximizers (which are deterministic allocation rules). To see this, we define (n + 1)! order based tie-breaking rules. Take any strict linear ordering P of the set of alternatives in A. Define an ordering ≻ on the set of utility vectors D as follows. For any i ∈ N, if
. If e i P e j , then for every 1 v i ∈ D i and every
Note that ≻ can be defined exactly (n + 1)! ways, one for each P . Let P be the set of all such orderings of D. Now, given a hierarchical allocation rule with (I 1 , . . . , I n ), we can construct (n + 1)! simple utility maximizers with U i = I i for all i ∈ N and taking as tiebreaking rule one of the orderings in P. Clearly, uniform randomization over these simple utility maximizers produce the hierarchical allocation rule. Hence, randomization over the hierarchical allocation rules is equivalent to randomization over simple utility maximizers. Thus, simple utility maximizers occupy a central role in the theory of private value single object auctions. By characterizing simple utility maximizers, Theorem 2 indirectly provides an axiomatic foundation for Border's hierarchical allocation rules. In particular, the interim allocation probability of any implementable allocation rule can be obtained by randomizing over the set of implementable and non-bossy allocation rules satisfying Condition C * .
Extension of Roberts' Theorem
Consider a general mechanism design set up with private values and quasi-linear utility. Let A be a finite set of alternatives. Suppose |A| ≥ 3. The type of agent i is denoted as v i ∈ R
|A|
and v i (a) denotes the valuation of agent i for alternative a. Roberts (1979) shows that if type space of every agent is R |A| , then for every onto and implementable allocation rule f , there exists λ 1 , . . . , λ n ≥ 0, not all of them equal to zero, and κ : A → R such that at every valuation profile v,
Such allocation rules are called affine maximizer allocation rules. Theorems 1 and 2 can be thought of as the analogue of Roberts' affine maximizer theorem in the single object auction model (under non-bossiness). It shows how much the set of implementable allocation rule expands in a restricted domain like the single object auction domain.
The Complete Characterization
Theorems 1 and 2 characterize implementable allocation rules under additional assumptions. In this section, we drop these additional assumptions and provide a complete characterization of implementable allocation rules. These characterizations are in the spirit of extending the Roberts' affine maximizer theorem. In particular, we show that an implementable allocation rule is equivalent to a generalized utility maximizer allocation rule. A generalized utility function (GUF) of agent i ∈ N is a function u i : V → R. Notice that the generalized utility of an agent may be negative also. Further, a simple utility function is a GUF. We will need the following version of single crossing property.
Definition 10 The GUFs (u 1 , . . . , u n ) satisfy top single crossing if for every i ∈ N, for every v −i ∈ V −i , and for every v i , v
The top single crossing condition is a very general inter-agent crossing condition. Such crossing conditions are extensively used in the literature of interdependent value auctionssee for instance, Cremer and McLean (1985) ; Maskin (1992) ; Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) ; Perry and Reny (2002) . For the finite type space, Cremer and McLean (1985) use conditions similar to our top single crossing to establish implementation (in ex post equilibrium) of the efficient allocation rule in the interdependent values model.
The standard definition of a "single crossing" property, which implies top single crossing, is the following.
Definition 11 GUFs (u 1 , . . . , u n ) satisfy single crossing if for every i, j ∈ N, for every
A GUF u i is increasing if for every v −i ∈ V −i and for every v i , v
Lemma 5 If GUFs (u 1 , . . . , u n ) satisfy single crossing and u i is increasing for every i ∈ N, then they satisfy top single crossing.
We are now ready to introduce a new class of implementable allocation rules.
Definition 12 An allocation rule f is a generalized utility maximizer if there exist GUFs (u 1 , . . . , u n ) satisfying top single crossing such that for every v ∈ V , f (v) = e i implies that i ∈ arg max i∈N ∪{0} u i (v), where u 0 (v) = 0.
Generalized utility maximizers are implementable. The proof is similar to the proof in Cremer and McLean (1985) , who establish implementation (in ex post equilibrium) of efficient allocation rule in an interdependent values model.
Lemma 6 If f is a generalized utility maximizer, then it is implementable.
Proof : Fix a generalized utility maximizer f , and let (u 1 , . . . , u n ) be the corresponding GUFs satisfying top single crossing. Consider agent i and v −i ∈ V −i . Also, consider any v i , v
Our characterization of implementability shows that implementability is equivalent to maximizing generalized utilities. Generalized utilities transform the original valuation of an agent to a new utility, which depends on the valuations of all the agents. In contrast to simple utility functions, generalized utility functions are much harder to construct. This illustrates how a natural axiom like non-bossiness helps to simplify the class of implementable allocation rules.
Generalized utility maximizers are similar to implementing the efficient allocation rule in an interdependent values model with the qualification that we allow generalized utilities to be negative, which is precluded in the standard interdependent value model. It is well known that the efficient allocation rule is not generally implementable in the interdependent values single object auction unless some inter agent crossing condition holds (Cremer and McLean, 1985; Maskin, 1992; Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000; Perry and Reny, 2002; Jehiel et al., 2006) . Our top single crossing condition is similar to these conditions in the interdependent values literature. Our result reveals a surprising and interesting connection between these seemingly different models.
Discussions
We conclude by discussing some of the open questions that remain.
Randomization and Bayesian Implementation. Although we focus on deterministic dominant strategy implementation, randomization is a natural extension of our model. Indeed, the monotonicity characterization of Myerson (1981) extends to single object auctions with randomization. Extending characterizations of deterministic allocation rules to randomized allocation rules present several challenges. A natural way to think of randomization is that of domain restriction -the utility from a lottery alternative is restricted to be the expected utility from the deterministic alternatives in its support. Thus, the challenges of going from deterministic to randomized allocation rules is similar to that of going from a larger domain to a restricted domain. For instance, a counterpart of Roberts' seminal result with randomization is still not known in the unrestricted domain.
However, we provided a relationship of our simple utility maximizer and Border's hierarchical allocation rules that can be used to obtain interim allocation probability of every Bayesian and randomized allocation rule. Hence, our characterizations can be used in an indirect way to characterize interim allocation probabilities of Bayesian implementable randomized allocation rules. However, the direct characterization remains an open question.
Optimizing payments. A popular research theme in auction theory and mechanism design is to "optimize" over the set of incentive compatible mechanisms. This usually involves optimizing over payments and assumes some prior distribution over valuations of agents by the mechanism designer. The implications of such optimizations in the single object auctions is fairly well understood.
Clearly, our results do not contribute to this literature. Our characterizations are more tailored towards understanding the inherent structure of deterministic single object auctions in private values set up. They completely describe the set of "options" available to a mechanism designer (without bothering about the distributional assumptions) in the single object auctions. Our main characterizations provide axiomatic foundations to various commonly used auctions.
We also believe that this opens a door for carrying out similar exercises in multidimensional mechanism design models, including the multi-object auction model. The problem of finding an expected revenue maximizing mechanism in such models is considered a dif-ficult problem Hart and Reny (2012) ; Hart and Nisan (2012) . Perhaps, understanding the structure of incentive compatible mechanisms will allow us to simplify these problems.
Appendix: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1 By virtue of Lemmas 1 and 2, we only need to show that if an allocation rule f is implementable and non-bossy then it is strongly rationalizable. We do the proof in several steps.
Step 1. For any i, j ∈ N ∪ {0} with i = j, consider 1 v i and 1 v j for some v i ∈ V i and v j ∈ V j . Suppose for some v −ij , we have f (v i , v j , v −ij ) = e i . We will show that if f is non-bossy, then
Step 2. We will first define a binary relations ≻ on D × D 8 using f as follows. For every
Further, for every i ∈ N and every v i ∈ V i , define
Step 3. Let
We now show that ≻ satisfies the following conditions:
1 for every x, y ∈ D f , either x ≻ y or y ≻ x (but not both), where
for every x ∈ D f and for every y / ∈ D f , x ≻ y,
. Then, by definition, either x ≻ y or y ≻ x. Hence, suppose y = 1 v ′ j for some j = i. Then, by monotonicity and non-bossiness,
i , e j }. Hence, either x ≻ y or y ≻ x. Since ≻ is anti-symmetric, either x ≻ y or y ≻ x but not both.
• Proof of (2). Pick
i by monotonicity, and this contradicts the fact that y / ∈ D f . Hence,
, and by definition, x ≻ y. Suppose y = 1 v ′ j for some j = i. Then, by monotonicity and non-bossiness,
Hence, x ≻ y.
• Proof of (3). At any valuation profile (
Step 4. We show that ≻ is transitive. Suppose for some i ∈ N,
We also know that for some i ∈ N and for some ǫ > 0, δ > 0, if
Step 5. We show that f is strongly rationalizable. Since ≻ is an anti-symmetric, irreflexive and transitive binary relation on D × D, we can extend it to an anti-symmetric, irreflexive, complete, and transitive binary relation ≻ ′ on D × D due to Szpilrajn's extension theorem -see Fishburn (1970) for instance. By definition of ≻ ′ and
Step 3, at any valuation profile (v 1 , . . . , v n ), if f (v 1 , . . . , v n ) = e i , then, 1 v i ≻ ′ 1 v j for all j = i. By definition, ≻ ′ is monotone.
Hence, f is strongly rationalizable.
Proof of Theorem 2
By Lemmas 3 and 4, an SUM allocation rule with order-based tie-breaking is implementable and non-bossy. We show that every implementable and non-bossy allocation rule satisfying Condition C * is an SUM allocation rule with order-based tie-breaking. We do the proof in various steps. Throughout we assume that V i = (0, β i ), where β i ∈ R ++ ∪ {∞}, for all i ∈ N.
Intuitively, the binary independence property says that the comparison of any pair of utility vectors is independent of what the other utility vectors are. 
Since e k ∈ W f (v ′′ ), we have f (v Similarly, suppose that f (v ′ j −ǫ, {v ′ i −ǫ ′ } i =j ) = e l for some l ∈ N \{j} and for all ǫ, ǫ ′ . By
